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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 19-3207 
____________ 
 
DURGA PRASAD GHARTI, 
                                                 Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a  
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (A208-926-527) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable John B. Carle 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 30, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 14, 2020)
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____________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Durga Prasad Gharti (“Petitioner” or “Gharti”) seeks review of an order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of 
his request for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (“INA”).  For the reasons that follow, we will grant the petition and 
remand to the BIA for further consideration of Gharti’s claim for asylum. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
Gharti is a Nepali national who has a wife and three children in Nepal.  He arrived 
in the United States on March 23, 2016 without a valid entry document.  Charged with 
removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), Gharti appeared with counsel before 
the IJ pursuant to a Notice to Appear, conceded removability, and indicated that he would 
be applying for asylum, withholding of removal, and for protection under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).1 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 Since Petitioner did not argue in his opening brief that the BIA erred in denying 
his CAT claim, we will consider that issue waived.  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 
502 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (Jan. 13, 2012).   
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At his hearing before the IJ, Gharti entered supporting documents into evidence, 
including a statement from his wife, a joint statement from his neighbors, proof of Nepali 
Congress Party membership, and a letter from the Nepali Congress Party.  Gharti also 
testified to the following in support of his claims for relief: 
In 2007, Gharti left Nepal to work for a year as a cook for an American company 
serving United States troops in Iraq.  After returning home in 2008, Muslims threatened 
him in February 2009 and angrily accused him of working for Americans who “were 
killing our Muslim brothers.”  A.R. 114.  In 2015, he was again threatened by Muslims 
when leaving his home on his way to work.  This time, the threat came in the form of a 
gesture of slitting one’s throat. 
Gharti identifies as a general member of the Nepali Congress political party.  He 
campaigned for the Nepali Congress Party during the 2013 election by hanging posters 
and urging the general public to vote for the Nepali Congress Party.  On November 19, 
2013 fifteen or sixteen people from the opposition party, the Maoist Party, entered his 
home and threatened that “if [he] didn’t support the Maoist [Party], there [would] be 
consequences,” and that they would kill him.  A.R. 131.  Gharti stated that he was 
frightened, so he responded by saying “I will support you,” and the Maoists left him 
alone.  A.R. 116–17.  However, Gharti continued to support the Nepali Congress Party.   
Two years later, in 2015, Gharti went to a Nepali Congress Party meeting in his 
village where he says he saw Maoists watching from fifty meters away.  Two days after 
the meeting, the group of Maoists that he saw at the meeting came to his home, beat him, 
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and threatened to kill him.  They accused him of lying about his support for them.  Gharti 
stated that he was able to get away and ran to the district’s headquarters, the equivalent of 
a county seat, where he felt he would be safer.  That was the last time Gharti saw his 
family. 
Gharti stated that he did not go to the police at the district headquarters because 
the police “did not investigate or pay any attention” to these types of incidents.  A.R. 142.  
He also testified that he “was not physically very injured” and did not have any scars as a 
result of the physical assault.  Id.  Gharti then fled by bus to Kathmandu.  Upon arriving 
in Kathmandu, Gharti contacted his wife who said the Maoists demanded that she bring 
Gharti back and threatened to harm Gharti.  Gharti testified that in order to save himself, 
he met with an agent who helped him get to the United States. 
On March 29, 2017, after his arrival in the United States, Gharti’s wife contacted 
him and told him that Maoists had come to their home asking for money.  After she 
refused, the Maoists assaulted her by ripping her clothes and threatening to kill her and 
her children. 
B. Procedural Background 
On February 13, 2018, the IJ issued an oral decision denying Gharti’s applications 
for relief and ordering him removed to Nepal.  Although the IJ found Gharti to be 
credible, the IJ concluded, inter alia, that Gharti had not met his burden to show that he 
was eligible for asylum because he had not demonstrated “persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
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social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  Gharti appealed the IJ’s 
decision to the BIA, and on September 9, 2019, the BIA dismissed Gharti’s appeal for the 
same reasons stated by the IJ.  Gharti timely filed the petition for review that is now 
before us.   
After the parties submitted their opening briefs, this Court issued Herrera-Reyes v. 
Attorney General, which elaborated on the test for past persecution in cases involving 
threats.  952 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2020).  We asked the parties to comment on the relevance 
of Herrera-Reyes to this case.  In response, the Attorney General filed a motion to 
remand so that the BIA and IJ could apply Herrera-Reyes in the first instance.  Gharti 
submitted a separate response arguing that Herrera-Reyes lends further support to his 
case for asylum and did not join the Attorney General’s motion. 
II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of removal issued by the BIA.  8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Because the BIA has affirmed the IJ’s decision and adopted the IJ’s 
reasoning, we will review the IJ’s opinion “to the extent affirmed or incorporated by the 
Board.”  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (Jan. 13, 
2012) (citations omitted).  We review the BIA’s factual findings under the deferential, 
substantial-evidence standard.  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). 
The BIA’s determination of whether or not a petitioner has proven past 
“persecution” or a “well-founded fear of persecution” that would render the petitioner 
eligible for asylum “is a question of fact, and the agency determination must be upheld if 
6 
 
it is supported by substantial evidence in the record.”  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 
F.3d 330, 340 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).  But we need not defer to the 
BIA’s findings where its “conclusions are based on inferences or presumptions that are 
not reasonably grounded in the record, viewed as a whole.”  Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y 
Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2007).  This includes instances where the BIA simply 
“ignore[s] or misconstrue[s] evidence[.]”  Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 
107 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. DISCUSSION  
Based on our precedent, our discussion begins with asylum.  This analysis requires 
us to conclude that we must grant the petition so that the BIA can determine the 
applicability of Herrera-Reyes in the first instance and so the BIA may reconsider 
Gharti’s asylum claim in light of evidence that the IJ and BIA previously overlooked. 
A. Legal Framework for Asylum2 
 
2 At the outset, we find that we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of 
withholding of removal.  To the extent that we should consider Gharti’s request regarding 
withholding of removal made fleetingly at the very end of his opening brief, we are 
precluded from doing so because the BIA deemed this claim waived and Gharti does not 
challenge the BIA’s finding of waiver.  A.R. 3; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may 
review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative 
remedies available to the alien as of right[.]”); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 
182 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that arguments not developed in the opening briefs should be 
considered waived).  A claim for withholding of removal under the INA § 241(b)(3), 
which is a separate form of relief, similarly requires that the applicant show persecution 
on account of a protected ground.  However, an applicant for withholding must 
demonstrate that such persecution is “more likely than not” to occur, whereas relief under 
asylum only requires that an applicant show that he or she is unwilling or unable to return 
to his or her country of origin.  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 348. 
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The Attorney General is authorized to grant asylum to a refugee if they are unable 
or unwilling to return to their country of origin “because of persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution.”  8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A).  Persecution “includes, 
but is not limited to, ‘threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so 
severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.’”  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 340 
(quoting Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2008)).  The applicant bears the 
burden of establishing past persecution or that a fear of future persecution is well-
founded, and that one of five protected grounds, “race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group, or political opinion[,] was or will be at least one central 
reason” for persecution.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 
191, 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Testimony, by itself, is sufficient to meet this burden, if 
credible.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
An applicant “who establishes that he or she was previously persecuted on account 
of a statutorily enumerated ground triggers a rebuttable presumption that the applicant 
has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”  Espinosa-Cortez, 607 F.3d at 107.  The 
Attorney General may rebut this presumption by establishing that the conditions in the 
applicant’s country have changed so as to make the applicant’s fear no longer reasonable 
 
We do, however, have jurisdiction over Gharti’s claims of asylum, which the BIA 
reviewed on the merits. 
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or that the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of his or 
her country.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i).  
However, “it is not necessary for a petitioner to show past persecution if [he or 
she] can nonetheless show a well-founded fear of future persecution without the benefit 
of such a presumption.”  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 345.  An applicant’s fear of future 
persecution is well-founded where the fear is based on one of the five statutorily 
protected grounds, there is a reasonable possibility of suffering if the applicant were 
returned, and the applicant is unable or unwilling to return because of his or her fear of 
persecution.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i).  Thus, to establish a well-founded fear of future 
persecution, the applicant must demonstrate both a subjective fear and an objectively 
reasonable possibility of persecution.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 520 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  But an applicant that can satisfy these elements to show a fear of future 
persecution nevertheless falls short of relief if the applicant “could avoid persecution by 
relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality.”  8 C.F.R. 
§  208.13(b)(2)(ii). 
 B. Remand is Necessary to Determine the Applicability of Herrera-Reyes and 
for Reconsideration based on the IJ and BIA’s Failure to Consider Evidence of a 
Particularized Threat 
 
Gharti raises two challenges to the BIA and IJ’s decisions to deny him relief under 
asylum.  First, he argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s finding that he failed to 
meet his burden for showing past persecution.  Second, he contends the BIA erred in 
affirming the IJ’s finding that he did not meet the objective prong to demonstrate a well-
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founded fear of future persecution on account of political opinion.3  Regarding the 
former, we will grant the petition for review and remand to the BIA to consider the 
applicability of our recent opinion in Herrera-Reyes to Gharti’s arguments on past 
persecution.  As to the latter, we agree with Petitioner and find that the IJ’s failure to 
consider evidence that the Maoists targeted Gharti constitutes error.  We will therefore 
grant the petition for review and remand to the BIA and IJ for reconsideration of whether 
Gharti presented substantial evidence to establish a well-founded fear of future 
persecution in light of this evidence. 
 
 1. The BIA and IJ Should Consider the Applicability of Herrera-Reyes to Past 
Persecution in the First Instance 
 
Our analysis usually begins with the presumption of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution based on a demonstration of past persecution since it “is often determinative 
of a petitioner’s asylum claim.”  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 345.  But we draw no 
conclusions regarding the BIA and IJ’s factual findings of past persecution related to the 
threats and assault at the hands of the Maoists.  Instead, we will grant the Attorney 
General’s motion to remand to the BIA for consideration, in the first instance, of 
Herrera-Reyes, which elaborated on the “concrete and menacing” standard related to 
 
3 Although the IJ and BIA also found that Gharti was ineligible for asylum based 
on a fear of future persecution on account of membership in a particular social group, 
Gharti does not challenge that determination in his opening brief.  We will therefore 
consider a claim on this protected ground waived.  Cf. Garcia, 665 F.3d at 502. 
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threats, and found that an asylum applicant’s evidence of past persecution must be 
viewed for the “cumulative effect,” including any escalation from threats to actual harm, 
952 F.3d at 107–08, 110–11.  Cf. Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 502 F.3d at 290 (remanding to 
the BIA for reconsideration in light of a relevant, recent opinion not previously applied 
by the IJ). 
2. The IJ and BIA Erred in Failing to Consider Maoist Threats and Assault 
as Particularized Threats Demonstrating an Objective Element of a Fear of Future 
Persecution  
 
Next, Gharti challenges the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s finding that he had not 
established a well-founded fear of future persecution because he had not shown, 
objectively, a reasonable possibility of a fear of future persecution on account of political 
opinion.  We agree with Petitioner and remand for further consideration.  
To satisfy the objective prong of a well-founded fear of future persecution, an 
applicant “must show she would be individually singled out for persecution or 
demonstrate that ‘there is a pattern or practice in his or her country of nationality . . . of 
persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. . . .’”  
Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)).  To determine whether an asylum applicant was persecuted based 
on an imputed political opinion, we look to whether “the persecutor attributed a political 
opinion to the victim, and acted upon the attribution.”  Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 
729 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003).  The asylum seeker must provide “some evidence of [motive], 
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direct or circumstantial.”  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 343 (quoting Elias-Zacarias, 502 
U.S. at 483); see also Canales-Vargas v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he factual circumstances alone may constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence of a 
persecutor’s . . . motives.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
The IJ’s finding that Gharti “failed to establish that his fear of persecution is 
objectively reasonable” was based entirely on the IJ’s analysis of Nepal’s country reports.  
A.R. 65.4  But in determining whether Gharti had met his burden to show that he would 
be singled out for his beliefs, the IJ overlooked the testimonial and documentary evidence 
that Maoists targeted Gharti and his family because of Gharti’s affiliation with the Nepal 
Congress Party.5  This includes testimony that, after Gharti publicly campaigned for the 
Nepali Congress Party in 2013, members of the Maoist opposition party entered Gharti’s 
home and threatened to kill him, as well as testimony of the physical assault Gharti 
endured at his home in 2015, days after Maoists saw him at a Nepali Congress Party 
meeting.  When the Maoists assaulted Gharti, they also accused Gharti of lying in 2013 
when he pledged his support for the Maoists out of fear, which could indicate that Gharti 
was the specific target of the Maoists’ violence.  The IJ also ignored testimony that 
 
4 However, we agree that the country reports are relevant to the IJ’s determination 
that Gharti could not show a pattern or practice in Nepal of persecuting persons who 
share Gharti’s political beliefs.   
5 The IJ specifically determined that “respondent has not established that he is 
likely to be singled out for persecution based on his political opinion. . . .”  A.R. 66.  For 
clarity, we reiterate that the standard for establishing a well-founded fear of future 
persecution for asylum relief is not whether an applicant is “likely” to be targeted, but 
whether there is a “reasonable possibility” of persecution.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i). 
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Maoists had returned to Gharti’s family home shortly after he fled his village, demanded 
that his wife bring Gharti back and again threatened to harm Gharti.  Finally, the IJ took 
note of Gharti’s wife’s documented statement that Maoists had assaulted her and 
threatened her family after Gharti had fled Nepal, but not for its relevance to whether 
Gharti had presented evidence of a particularized threat of future persecution. 
Since the IJ’s finding and BIA’s summary affirmance is unsupported by the 
record, we decline to defer to the IJ’s factual finding.  Espinosa-Cortez, 607 F.3d at 113–
14 (“Although our review of the BIA’s conclusion that a person does not have a well-
founded fear of persecution is deferential, the BIA may not simply overlook evidence in 
the record that supports the applicant’s case.”).  We will therefore remand to the BIA for 
further consideration of this relevant evidence in its determination of whether Gharti has 
met his burden to show a well-founded fear of future persecution that would entitle him 
to asylum relief.  See Garcia, 665 F.3d at 504 (remanding for consideration of other 
elements in application for relief not previously considered by the BIA). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We will grant the petition for review and remand to the BIA for further 
consideration of Gharti’s claim for asylum consistent with this opinion. 
